N
ow that Medicare will pay hospitals on the basis of diagnosisrelated groups (DRG), prospective payment will likely become the dominant method by which hospital care is purchased. In addition to the states that have established mandatory hospital rate-setting programs for all or most payers, the addition of Medicare, which is responsible for over 35 percent of hospital billings, means that almost half of hospital revenues will soon come from prospective systems. 1 The Medicare DRG system and the prospective system of some states apply only to the payment of operating costs, however. While the Congress recognized the need to revise the way that capital costs are reimbursed to be consistent with prospective payment of operating costs, it deferred the decision to allow time for additional analysis. 2 States are reviewing their methods of paying for capital as well.
This article examines payment for hospital capital in the context of prospective payment for operating costs. It begins with some background material on hospital capital financing, including an examination of problems with continuing the current method of capital reimbursement. It then reviews methods for payment for capital in other industries. The largest section is devoted to three major issues that Medicare and other third-party payers face in deciding how to pay for capital-how much to reimburse in the aggregate, how to distribute it to individual hospitals, and how to smooth the transition from the current system to one more consistent with prospective payment of operating costs.
Hospital Capital Financing
Hospitals use real and financial capital assets-land, buildings, equipment, and working capital-along with other resources such as labor, supplies, and purchased services to produce care. In 1983, total assets in community hospitals had a book value of over $110 billion. 3 This represents a 450 percent increase since 1970, similar to the increase in total hospital expenditures. Hospital assets are financed by debt, retained operating surpluses, grants from public and private sources (in nonprofit hospitals), and investors' equity capital (in for-profit hospitals). The sources have changed dramatically over time. During the ten-year period 1973-1983, the percentage of hospital construction financed through tax-exempt bonds has increased from 20 percent to 50 percent, the percentage through hospital reserves has increased from 10 percent to 15 percent, while the percentage financed from taxable bonds, public sources, and philanthropy has decreased from 70 percent to 35 percent. 4 Decisions concerning capital expenditures are particularly Importatant in hospital care. With rapidly changing technology often embodied in major pieces of equipment, capital expenditures play a large role in both the costs and quality of hospital care. Consequently, capital payment policies may have important influences on these critical dimensions of hospital care.
Under the prospective payment system, Medicare will continue to reimburse hospitals for capital expenses on a cost basis. The program pays its share of depreciation, interest, and rental payments judged to be allowable, and a return on equity capital when the hospital is investor owned. This capital payment system has been criticized for its lack of incentives. Hospitals are not encouraged to design plant and equipment in the most cost-efficient manner, or choose the least-cost method of financing. Indeed, the lack of consistency between capital reimbursement formulas and typical debt repayment schedules leads to increased cash flow to hospitals during the early years of project financing.
The interim combination of prospective payment for operating costs, and cost reimbursement for costs will distort incentives further, and possibly lead to an increase in some types of capital spending. By substituting equipment for labor, for example by developing a more automated laundry, hospitals will continue to receive the DRG payment for operating costs while receiving an increased capital payment, thereby increasing total payments from Medicare. But these incentives do not imply that there will be a capital spending boom. Since equipment has operating costs associated with its use (technicians' salaries, for example), prospective payment of operating costs will dampen enthusiasm for capital expenditures that do not increase revenue through more admissions or decrease operating costs. In addition, the prospective payment legislation made clear that cost reimbursement for capital would not continue much longer, and warned hospitals not to count on cost-based payment for capital projects initiated on or after March 1, 1983 .
Capital Payments In Other Industries
In unregulated industries, the firm sets a price reflecting what the market will bear, and makes decisions on capital investments in accordance with expected profitability. At times, this price will more than cover operating costs and the cost of capital while, at other times, it will not be sufficient to cover all costs. In theory, over time, market prices will be sufficient to cover both operating and capital costs. If they are less than costs, some firms will not make the necessary investments to maintain their capital stock and ultimately will withdraw from the market, which in turn will lead to higher prices for the remaining firms. If prices are higher than costs, additional firms will invest to enter the market, and will lead, in turn, to lower prices. Incentives stemming from the potential of profits or losses will also lead to an efficient mix of capital and other inputs. The firm has complete discretion to decide on specific capital projects.
In public utilities, capital payment is quite different. In order to take advantage of economies of scale, a single supplier is given a franchise to serve an area. Since the market then cannot be relied upon to set a fair price under monopoly circumstances, prices are regulated so as to yield a "fair" rate of return to investors.This means that the price of the service should cover operating costs, depreciation, interest expenses, and a return on investor-supplied capital comparable to alternative investment opportunities with comparable degrees of risk. The public utility commission also plays a major role in management decisions such as the appropriate quality of service, the rate structure, and major capital projects. This intervention is based on the belief that, in the absence of competition, extensive regulation beyond that concerning investors' rate of return is required to ensure a socially desirable outcome. As prospective payment becomes the dominant method of hospital financing, the issue of using markets versus public utility regulation to allocate resources will come into sharper focus. Under cost reimbursement, many critical decisions such as the ag to hospital care were left neither to t regate amount of resources going he market nor to a public agency. While reimbursement formulas-focused on prices being "fair"-that is, reflecting incurred costs-neither the total level of payment nor the nature of the product was reviewed by payers. The one exception, a certificate-of-need (CON) process, exercised veto power over major construction and new service decisions, but intervened little in decisions about equipment purchases.
By substituting prospective payment for cost reimbursement of operating costs, both public utility and market features have been added. Public utility aspects include social control over the overall costliness of services. By setting the prospective rates, the agency ultimately determines the volume of resources that hospitals can apply to provide care. Prospective payment is marketlike, however, in that the payer does not make decisions about how each hospital is to allocate resources to conform to the overall level allowed by the prospective rates, but uses financial incentives instead. In fact, Medicare's DRG-based system is perhaps closer to a market than state prospective systems in that it establishes a series of prices (instead of giving the hospital an overall revenue constraint), and refrains from reviewing hospital budgets.
Issues In Paying For Capital
If payment for capital is to become prospective, three major issues need to be addressed. The first involves the-appropriate level of payment for capital for hospitals in the aggregate. The second issue is how to distribute this aggregate amount to specific hospitals. The third involves how to smooth hospitals' transition from the old system to the new one. Aggregate Amount of Reimbursement. Determining the appropriate amount of reimbursement in the aggregate is a complex issue because more is involved than whether the reimbursement is "fair." The most difficult aspect is finding the amount of reimbursement that will lead to the "correct" magnitude of investment by hospitals. But a wide range of opinion exists regarding the desirable aggregate amount of hospital capital assets in the future. Much of the debate is between what hospitals would like to build and what the third-party payers are willing to pay for.
Many in the hospital industry warn that adequate capital funding will not be available to finance "needed" capital projects. They point to rapid advances in medical technology, many of which require new equipment purchases and renovated facilities if they are to diffuse into medical practice. They claim that the problem is exacerbated by imminent needs to replace the many facilities that were constructed during the 1950s under Hill-Burton grants and loans. But hospitals' abilities to finance these needs is limited by a deterioration in access to borrowing, stemming from a rising proportion of debt. Indeed, inner city hospitals warn that they are using capital payments to pay for the operating costs of caring for the uninsured and cannot receive funding to replace existing capital.
On the other hand, many question the desirability of maintaining all hospital facilities and encouraging the rapid diffusion of all new technologies. They point to admission rates being much higher than those achieved in health maintenance organizations and the fact that bed availability appears to influence admission rates. 5 They assert that many new technologies have unknown or small impacts on health, but are nevertheless extremely expensive.
The federal government appears to have taken the view that increases in hospital cost should be slowed from the rates experienced in recent years. For example, recent Medicare legislation permits hospital reimbursements per admission to increase at only one percentage point more than the market basket index (an index of prices that hospitals pay for inputs), whereas the historical trend has been between three and four percentage points above the market basket. This slowing in growth of operating expenses may imply lower levels of investment or at least a slower growth than has been experienced of late.
This conceptual debate concerning the desirable amount of hospital capital assets helps explain the wide range of estimates of hospital capital requirements for the 1980s. The highest estimate of needs is by KidderPeabody-$158 billion to $193 billion over the decade. 6 Their conclusion is based on an estimate of the current age distribution of facilities and assumptions that modernization and then replacement of hospital beds are needed at specified ages. ICF Incorporated's model, similar in concept to Kidder-Peabody's but somewhat more sophisticated, yields a range of $95 to $130 billion. 7 Cohodes and Kinkead have shown that these estimates exceed a projection that simply extrapolates recent trends-$100 billion, and one using a different set of assumptions-$80 billion. 8 In other words, the larger estimates may imply higher replacement costs per bed,, higher growth in the number of beds, or more rapid replacement and modernization than has been the recent experience.
The current federal budgetary picture and prospects for large deficits in Medicare's Hospital Insurance Trust Fund leave a climate inhospitable to pleas to increase Medicare's capital reimbursements in the aggregate. 9 Since the prospective payment legislation used the concept of "budget neutrality" in the setting of DRG rates, many have talked in terms of a similar guideline for capital payment. In this case aggregate capital expenditures in the Medicare program would be set at the level that analysts estimate them to be under current policies. 10 A system of Medicare capital reimbursement that maintained "budget neutrality" might be adequate to support a $100 billion expenditure over the 1980s. In 1983, about 7 percent of Medicare reimbursements to hospitals were for capital costs (including return on equity). Assuming continuation of this ratio (a crude definition of budget neutrality), an inflation rate during the 1980s similar to that used in the other projections of capital needs, and that all payers reimburse capital costs in the same ratio to operating costs, aggregate capital reimbursement from all payers during the 1980s would amount to about $100 billion. This might support the $100 billion in capital investment-that Cohodes and Kinkead identified as an extrapolation of current trends.
11
Focusing on capital requirements may not be a fruitful road to setting capital reimbursements, however, especially under a prospective system. The problems of defining need and estimating the inflation rate in the future mean that the projections are subject to a wide range of error. Furthermore, estimating the amount of reimbursement necessary to support a given level of capital expenditures is also difficult. In addition, it is easy to overstate the importance of the precise aggregate amount of capital reimbursement in a prospective system. Since aggregate capital reimbursement is only about 7 percent of total expenditures under current policies, a capital add-on to the prospective rate, which is 25 percent higher or lower than the current amount, would have an effect on the prospective rate of less than 2 percent. In contrast, the combination of formulas in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) and the budget neutrality provision of the prospective payment legislation is expected to reduce Medicare reimbursement to hospitals in their 1985 reporting periods by 9 percent from what they would otherwise have been. Payments to Specific Hospitals. Once the aggregate amount of capital reimbursement is determined, the decision about how to distribute it to hospitals must be made. If prospective methods are to be used, an industrywide rate could be developed, such as an add-on to the prospective payment for operating costs, or a hospital-specific rate could be used, based on an institution's costs during a base period. The industrywide rate would be the more marketlike, in that the price paid would not depend upon hospital-specific cost conditions. Industrywide Rate. In Medicare, an addition to the DRG rate would come closest to the decisions made by the Congress concerning reimbursement of operating costs. A percentage factor might be most appropriate because the current DRG rates, which are based on past bills of Medicare patients in each category, already reflect relative capital costs as well as operating costs of different case types. For example, if a particular DRG admission had a payment rate of $2,000, then a capital allowance that continues the current ratio of capital to operating costs would be $153 [2,000x.071 / (l-.071)]. 12 Using such a formula to determine capital payments would put hospitals at risk for the consequences of their capital decisions. They would weigh the costs of capital projects against the likely increase in prospective payments. This would discourage construction of underused facilities and projects that would not be important in attracting patients. Hospitals would also have strong incentives to economize on financing costs of given projects. This approach would affect different types of hospitals unevenly (see Table l ), although the variation as a percentage of total reimbursements would be quite small-much less than under the original proposal for DRG-based reimbursement for operating costs. 13 Patterns of gainers and losers appear to reflect long-standing differences in patterns of capital spending. Investor-owned hospitals would lose, in the sense that prospective payments for capital would be lower than under the present system. Their current rate of capital payments under Medicare of 8.9 percent of total reimbursements is higher than the average of Excludes return on equity.
6.6 percent (both rates exclusive of return on equity). 14 The higher proportion of capital expenses shown in the table probably reflects newer facilities and a higher proportion of debt financing. Large urban public hospitals, which have tended to invest relatively less than other hospitals, would gain under prospective payment. Their current rate of capital payments under Medicare is 3.9 percent of total reimbursement. Hospitals in the South, which have had relatively higher levels of investment, would be losers.
An interesting finding is the absence of a relationship between the complexity of a hospital's Medicare case mix and gains or losses from prospective payment of capital. This implies that capital requirements for relatively costly cases are generally in line with operating costs for them. Teaching hospitals' capital costs, on the other hand, are not as high, relative to other hospitals, as are their operating costs, so they would gain. Hospital-Specific Prospective Payments. Prospective payment for capital could be tailored to individual hospital circumstances instead of being based on industry averages. The simplest way would be to take each hospital's 1982 reimbursements and apply a trend factor to determine the prospective payment in future years. Since reimbursements would be based upon costs in a base year, and not affected by hospital decisions made subsequent to that, the incentives would be the same as under an industrywide rate.
The major difference between the industrywide and hospital-specific ap roach is the extent to which the prospective rates reflect an individu a hospital's needs. The former approach assumes that such needs, at l least over time, depend mostly on the costliness of a hospitals' case mix and local wage rates. The latter approach assumes that many other factors are important, so that actual reimbursements in a base period would come closer to the pattern of need. This tradeoff was encountered in the debate on prospective payments for operating costs, where the Reagan administration suggested the industrywide approach while the American Hospital Association suggested a hospital-specific approach. Most of the arguments relative to the earlier debate would apply here as well.
The fact that hospital capital spending tends to be characterized by long cycles would make hospital-specific prospective payment relatively less attractive for capital than for operating costs, however. Since facilities are long lived, major projects occur infrequently. This means that actual reimbursements in a single year are unlikely to reflect a hospital's longterm needs. very well. Those hospitals that had just completed major projects would tend to be paid too much, while hospitals about to initiate a project would be paid too little.
Maryland has pursued a hospital-specific policy not entirely dependent on actual reimbursements during a base period. The component of a hospital's rate that reflects the costs of its buildings also reflects the state commission's estimate of financial requirements associated with replacement needs. This is a regulatory approach in the sense that the commission must determine which beds need to be replaced, when, and how costly the replacement should be, but nevertheless uses incentives in that hospitals can do what they want with the funds.
Problems Of Transition
Whether an industrywide or hospital-specific approach is followed, the transition to prospective payment would be difficult due to the long-lived nature of facilities. This would not be a problem in the long run, given hospitals' ability to retain funds and borrow, but a sudden transition to a prospective system could catch some individual hospitals at the wrong stage of their capital spending cycle. For example, under an industrywide rate, a hospital having just completed a major project might be disadvantaged because very high cost-based capital reimbursements were anticipated when the project was begun. A hospital about to initiate a major project would be disadvantaged because the cost-reimbursement system would not have enabled it to accumulate as much in reserves as a prospective system would have. The magnitude of these transitional problems can be seen in Table 1 . In 1981, 25 percent of hospitals had cost-based Medicare reimbursements lower than 4 percent of total costs, while 5 percent had reimbursements exceeding 15 percent. Substituting a prospective payment of a uniform percentage add-on to the DRG rate would abruptly reduce some hospitals' capital reimbursements. Hospitals with debt-fixed repayment obligations could be stressed considerably.
A number of options to smooth the transition are available. A blending of industrywide and hospital-specific prospective payment could be used. For example, capital reimbursement could be based 90 percent on 1982 costs in the first year, 80 percent in the second year, and so forth, with the balance an add-on to the DRG rate. This is similar to the phase-in approach that the Congress used for operating costs, which used a blend of a hospital's own costs in 1982 and DRG rates. Such a blending would probably avoid most of the situations where required repayments exceeded capital reimbursements and resolve an important part of the problems related to hospital capital spending cycles. It would not affect aggregate outlays directly, though by reducing the ma nitude of appeals, it could ultimately reduce outlays. A variation of this option would use current cost reimbursements instead of the 1982 level. This would provide some relief to hospitals with projects "in the pipeline." On the other hand, incentives would be diluted somewhat.
Another option for the transition would pay the higher of the prospective rate or required debt repayments. This would avoid debt repayment problems in all cases, but would result in increased outlays unless the prospective rate were reduced accordingly. Such a reduction could be substantial during the first few years. 15 While this option would give substantial assistance to those hospitals recently completing major capital projects, it would not help those whose cycles are somewhat later and would soon have initiated large projects.
The problems of transition associated with prospective payment for capital have led some to propose approaches that have elements of both prospectivity and incurred costs. One could apply prospective payment to equipment but continue cost-based payment for buildings. This would avoid most of the these problems, because equipment is not as durable as buildings. It would also eliminate most of the current distortion that encourages substitution of capital for other inputs such as labor. On the other hand, incentives for economizing on the costs of construction and its financing would be lost.
